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Summary. May God may be understood and referred to as a “person”? This is a live 
debate in contemporary theological and philosophical circles. However, despite the 
attention this debate has received, the vital question of how to account for God’s 
trinitarian nature has been mostly overlooked. Due to trinitarian concerns about the 
unqualified use of “person” as an analogy for the Godhead, I intervene in this debate 
with a two-fold proposal. The first is that proponents of using a person as an analo-
gy for the Godhead will be better served by using a psychologically informed analo-
gy of a “self” instead. In particular, the Dialogical Self model of a person holds much 
promise. In what follows, I argue that the “Dialogical Self Analogy” for the Godhead 
is more likely to uphold God’s trinitarian nature, avoid trinitarian confusion and rela-
ted problems than “person” analogies do. The primary benefit of speaking of God as 
SCOTT HARROWER
92  9(2 ) /2021
a Dialogical Self is that it offers a psychologically modelled analogy for God, whilst 
avoiding the language of person, yet strongly taking into account God’s trinitarian 
nature. This has the important benefit of preserving the concept and language of 
“person” for the trinitarian persons (the prosopa/hypostases), and hence avoiding 
the linguistic, conceptual and ecumenical confusion that arises when referring to 
the Godhead as a person. The strength of using the model and language of a Dialo-
gical Self as an analogy for the Godhead (instead of person) is demonstrated by sho-
wing its compatibility with Erickson’s criteria for describing the Trinity. 
Keywords: Trinity; Person; Personalism; Dialogical Self Theory; Dialogical; Analo-
gy, God.
1. Introduction: Why psychological science may help 
us understand and relate to God as person 
In his Confessions, Augustine prayed: “… You made us with yourself as our 
goal, and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (Augustine 2018, 3). In 
this prayer, Augustine refers to God as a “you,” a “you” who is available for 
a loving interpersonal relationship with human beings. Indeed, through-
out the Confessions, Augustine speaks to God as if he were alike a human 
person with a distinct personality and who acts in interpersonal ways. Au-
gustine pointed out that we only find our own person’s rest in a person-
al relationship with God when we understand him as a “You” who is the 
grounds of a “you-to-me” relationship (Stump 2016, 107–108). For Augus-
tine, God is akin to a human person, and may be related to as a person of 
sorts. So God is personal and alike a person in a number of ways, yet Au-
gustine was deeply aware that God is not one person or a mere person. All 
analogies have limits and when it comes to the Godhead, this limitation 
is driven by the fact that God is God the Trinity: one God in three persons 
with differentiation within the unity of God (Augustine, Letter 169). In the 
course of his magisterial The Trinity, his efforts to affirm to oneness and 
the threeness of God included his use of the psychological analogy for God 
as well as social ones. The psychological analogy for the Trinity deployed 
human psychology as the basis for its explanatory scope; by means of it 
he could include the key facets of God’s oneness, threeness, as well as the 
rich trinitarian relations that make God who he is (Augustine 1963, books 
8–11). Augustine’s deployment of psychological insights for the sake of 
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ensuring the trinitarian structure of Christian devotion and maintain-
ing God’s oneness-in-threeness for theology is an instructive example for 
Christians across the ages. This essay will follow in his example of using 
psychological science of the day as the foundation for an analogy for the 
Godhead that can account for his oneness-in-threeness.
Today Sarah, a fellow member of my local church, also prays to God as 
a “you,” and has interpersonal expectations of God. Her person-to-per-
son expectations include anticipating that God will thoughtfully respond 
to her prayers, take care of her wellbeing, both hear and receive her wor-
ship, and be present to her in Christ in the Eucharist, as well as uniting 
her to himself via the Holy Spirit. Sarah is typical of Western Christians, 
for whom “the idea that God is a ‘person’ is a necessary and fundamental 
part of their beliefs” (Te Velde 2011, 359). If Sarah were prohibited from 
thinking of the Godhead as a person, it would be difficult for her to think 
of God as eternally interactive and loving; and if God were none of those 
things, how could God be worthy of worship? To have a personal relation-
ship with God seems to require that God is a person. The notion of God 
as a person is far more preferable than the alternative, which is that God 
is a non-person.
Both St. Augustine and Sarah treat God in a manner that is very simi-
lar to the ways in which we deal with human persons. But is the concept 
and language of person appropriate and helpful for relating and referring 
to God? Moreover, how do we deal with the fact that God is the Godhead 
of three hypostases, a Trinity of persons? How does Sarah, for example, 
relate to God as one person, yet have expectations such as that one di-
vine hypostases in particular (God the Son incarnate) be especially and 
uniquely present in the Lord’s Supper or primarily responsible for her un-
ion with God (God the Holy Spirit)? Thus, not only do we have to deal with 
the issue of referring to God as a person, but as the Trinity of three hy-
postases (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), and in turn how this affects the 
way we incorporate person language into our references for, and expec-
tations of, God. 
Further, not only do we have the question of the appropriateness of 
person language for God, but also the problem of potentially using differ-
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ent senses for the same terminology: namely, using the term person for 
God in an absolute sense with respect to the Godhead, and in a particular 
simpliciter sense with respect to each person of the Trinity (Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit). In his own time, Augustine employed his own psycho-
logical analogy for speaking about the oneness and threeness of the trini-
tarian Godhead. But for Sarah today, what resources may she draw upon? 
More specifically, what resources from psychological science are at Sa-
rah’s disposal today?
Before moving to Dialogical Self Theory and its model of the human 
person, we need to set the context and contours for using it within the “Is 
God a person?” debate. There is a lively debate about whether or not the 
Godhead can be conceived as a person. Hewitt states that believing that 
God is a person is “a common current of opinion both inside and outside 
the academy. The claim that God is a person is a force to be reckoned with 
in the philosophy of religion” (Hewitt 2018, 5). It is important to note 
that there is some disagreement in terms of the nature of the language 
we apply to God – i.e. univocal or analogous – the view that God counts 
as a person is popular. In addition, it is noteworthy that that the majority 
of the “God is a person” authors also hold that God is personal in terms of 
his interactions with others. On the first point see (Harrower 2014).
A sharp divide exists between theologians who claim the Godhead 
may be conceived of as a person, and those who claim that he is not. That 
God may be understood, and referred to, as a person is affirmed to differ-
ent degrees by contemporary scholars such as Plantinga, He states this 
in the context of arguing that God is not a property: “No property could 
have created the world; no property could be omniscient, or, indeed, know 
anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn’t a person but a mere ab-
stract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life” (Plant-
inga 1980, 47). Page (2019), Stump (2016), Burns (2015) and Grimi (2018) 
also affirm this line of thinking. On the affirmative side of the debate, 
Swinburne has claimed that it is normative for Christians to understand 
God as a person: viewing God as a person is “the most elementary claim 
of theism” (Swinburne 1993, 101). For myself, due to concerns I call “trini-
tarian unease,” I am more comfortable speaking of God as personal rather 
THE DIALOGIC AL SELF ANALOGY FOR THE GODHEAD…
95 9(2 ) /2021
than as a person, and of reserving the language of person for the trinitar-
ian persons.
Employing an unqualified or vague concept of “person” as an analogy 
for the Godhead faces problems including (1) the lack of warrant for re-
garding God as a person; (2) novelty in terms of use; (3) destabilizing the 
settled conciliar tradition with reference to using person to refer to di-
vine persons; (4) confusion: applying the concept and language of person 
to the Godhead in addition to the trinitarian persons (the prosopa/ hy-
postasis) is likely to cause referential and conceptual confusion because 
the same language would be used to point out two different realities to do 
with the divine life; (5) The problem of initiating further debate; (6) ex-
plicit denial: luminaries in both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant 
tradition at times explicitly deny the use of person to refer to the God-
head; (7) ad hoc use only in the history of Christian theology; (8) ex-
cellent Christological and trinitarian reasons for restricting the use of 
person to the divine hypostasis and to human beings; (9) meeting the de-
velopment of doctrine criterion; (10) the absence of a contemporary anal-
ogy for how a human person could serve as an analogy of the God’s trin-
itarian life. The best case for restricting the language of person to the 
divine prosopa/hypostases is made by (Ratzinger 1990).
However, I acknowledge that there are specific contexts within which 
we should refer to God as a person rather than a non-person, yet I would 
argue that whenever we use the language of person in an absolute sense 
for the Godhead, it needs to be heavily qualified. For example, I refer to 
God as “Absolute Person” in light of his trinitarian nature in (Harrower 
2019, 12).Therefore, within this debate, my focus is on how successful the 
models of person used for God either do or do not account for God’s trini-
tarian nature. For example, when referring to God as an analogy of a per-
son, Swinburne projects a monistic individualist view of a human person 
onto God: God is: “something like a ‘person without a body (i.e. a spirit) 
who is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything, is perfectly 
good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the creator 
and sustainer of the universe” (Swinburne 1993, 1). More recently he has 
restated his view that God is a person: God is “a person without a body 
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(i.e. a spirit), present everywhere, the creator and sustainer of the uni-
verse, a free agent, able to do everything (i.e. omnipotent), knowing all 
things, perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, immutable, eternal, 
a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship” (Swinburne 2016, 2). In 
this example, Swinburne uses the analogy of a person for God, yet does 
so with God’s oneness clearly in view, but his trinitarian nature is entirely 
absent from playing any role in the analogy – God sounds very much like 
a mere individual. 
In today’s secular context Swinburne’s view of what kind of person 
God is sounds like an independent individual, known as the “Buffered 
Self” approach to the person (Taylor 2007, 25–40; Smith 2014, 140–142). 
This definition of the person, or self, sees them as buffered in that they 
are a single self who is self-enclosed, self-determined, and primarily self-
focused. The Buffered Self is not a self who is comprised of internal re-
lations, but is essentially a monadic self-made and self-standing “I.” On 
this view the person is neither essentially relational nor conversational 
– neither within their own being nor in their relationships to others. To 
my mind, any model of a person that is alike the secular buffered secular 
individual is a very poor analogy for the Christian God, who is necessarily 
one God comprised of three “I”’s in relation to one another and who are 
identified with the divine substance. 
If we are going to speak about God as a person in our secular context, 
we need to find a richer model for what a person is, so that we take ac-
count of both God’s oneness and threeness (or one-in-threeness) when we 
speak about the Godhead by means of an analogy with a human person. 
This is why I will shortly turn to Dialogical Self Theory as a rich and ro-
bust model for the human person that can serve as the basis for an anal-
ogy for speaking of God in a way that can account for his trinitarian na-
ture. Before doing so, it is worth noting some reasons for why theologians 
do not deal with God’s triune nature, as well as some of the very signif-
icant worldview implications of dealing with God as a mere individual 
rather than a trinitarian being. 
Trinitarian unease provides the warrant for a number of explicit and 
implicit reasons that may be factors in theological and philosophical reti-
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cence when it comes to developing analogies for God as a person that can 
take his triune nature into account. Amongst the key ones are (a) igno-
rance of models of a person that go beyond proposing that they are a Car-
tesian individual; and (b) the problem of potential confusion generated 
by applying the concept and language of person to the Godhead in addi-
tion to the trinitarian persons (the prosopa/hypostases). Where problem 
(a) may be solved by research into the psychological sciences, problem 
(b) is hard to overcome unless there is a shift away from using the lan-
guage (but not the concept) of person for the Godhead because such dual 
use of person language is likely to cause referential and conceptual confu-
sion because the same language would be used to point out two different 
realities to do with the divine life. We now turn to the significant meta-
theological and meta-ethical implications of disregarding God’s trinitar-
ian nature in the discussions of whether or not he is alike a person. 
2. Theological Problems resulting from Trinitarian Unease
There are significant worldview consequences of arguing that God is 
a person akin to a single buffered human individual. The perspective on 
God and the meta-ethics that flows from it may be described as “individ-
ualistic personalism.” Individualistic personalism is the view that God is 
a person, has a unique personality, and interacts with humans and angels in 
interpersonal ways, yet his personality and interactions are not clearly de-
pendent on, nor shaped by the fact that he is God the Trinity. The problem 
with this view is chiefly that it ignores God’s triadic nature as the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit. Dealing with God in an absolute manner without re-
gard for his triunity closely resembles the Islamic view of God. Therefore 
it is an anti-realist view. In addition, it also resembles the God of Deism, 
the God of the rationalist. Such deism comes at massive metaphysical, and 
meta-ethical cost. It comes at the loss of “trinitarian personalism,” which 
is the theological and ethical view that God’s triune nature as three divine 
persons in holy and loving relationships of mutual-recognition and creativity 
demonstrates that persons-in-relationship are the primary, most valuable, as 
well fundamental generating points and sources in reality – thereby providing 
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theological orientation to human reality as persons-in-relationships and eth-
ical orientation because humanity’s highest goals are dependent upon holy 
and loving persons-in-relationships.1 
Trinitarian personalism is a uniquely revealed Christian foundation 
for human life and ethics, which works from the fact of God’s trinitar-
ian nature as the core reality in the cosmos. It is a very powerful and all-
encompassing worldview: God’s relational life as persons-in-relationship 
provides the theological and ethical framework for understanding human 
nature and also those works by which the Trinity enables human peo-
ple and groups to pursue holy and loving moral inter-personalism as the 
highest goal of existence. If the nature of the Trinity is dropped from the 
analogy for the Godhead, we run the risk of relegating trinitarian per-
sonalism to the secular dustbin. Yet, within humans there is a craving for 
a relational reality, which may be why in the wake of relegating the Trin-
ity to the sidelines of theology, a number of non-trinitarian efforts have 
tried to recapture the relational nature of reality. 
Very serious and significant efforts to re-center reality on a kind of re-
lational personalism – such as the panentheistic or pantheistic oneness 
personalism, or oneness Pentecostalism, or merely individualistic per-
sonalism– have recently tried to fill this void, with increasing popular-
ity. The common denominator amongst these is the search for non-trini-
tarian avenues of establishing human relationality with God and others: 
such as creation participating within God himself, or his spiritual rela-
tionships with human beings. To my mind, disregarding God’s trinitar-
ian nature is as serious as arguing that God is more alike a non-person 
1 More fully, trinitarian personalism is a meta-physical and meta-ethical view that 
stems from the fact that God is the Trinity: the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Given the 
trinity, the generative core of reality is a spiritual being who is loving and holy in his 
own personal and intra-personal life, and is thus worthy of worship per se. The triadic 
perfect life of God establishes the personalist principle for metaphysics and meta-ethics 
– which is that persons in holy and loving relationships are the ideal priority at all times. 
The personalist principle of prioritizing persons in relationship over all other things 
is expressed in Christian worship and by appropriately emulating a  human nature-
appropriate version of God’s moral, relational, creative and perspectival perfections for 
the sake of the common good and the glorification of God. The personalist response to 
God is trinitarian because it is enabled by the Spirit of Christ and moves believers to 
participate in God’s renewal of all things by the missions of the Son and of the Spirit. 
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than a person, because without these trinitarian foundations it is harder 
to hold that persons-in-holy-and-loving relations are the essential and 
most valuable reality at the core of cosmic life (Cole 2016). Due to the se-
riousness of the theological issues at hand, in what follows I address the 
need to find a richer model of a person in order to account for God’s trini-
tarian nature when we speak of him as such. The first step is to replace 
our language of the person with the language of a self, and the second is 
to understand such a self as a dialogical kind of a self. The result is that 
rather than referring to God as a person, which creates a number of dif-
ficulties, we can more thoughtfully speak of God as a dialogical self. The 
result of these shifts in language and concept is to deploy Dialogical Self 
Theory as a model that serves as the human analogy for speaking of God 
as a personal being who is the rich inter-relationality of the Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit. 
The Self 
A human self can serve as our analogy for the Godhead. A human self is 
a being with the capacity to be self-reflexive and identify themselves as 
“me.” The self “is an ‘I’ that thinks and a ‘me’ that is the content of those 
thoughts” (Oyserman, Elmore and Smith 2012, 73). In other words, a self 
stands behind reflexive thought: “reflecting on oneself is both a common 
activity and a mental feat. It requires that there is an ‘I’ that can consid-
er an object that is ‘me’. The term self includes both the actor who thinks 
(‘I am thinking’) and the object of thinking (‘about me’). Moreover, the 
actor both is able to think and is aware of doing so” (Oyserman, Elmore 
and Smith 2012, 72). The self is the integration of all the structures, pro-
cesses and phenomena (including various I-positions as per below) that 
make up each “I.” And such an “I” is the basis of intentions and is respon-
sible for their actions. One way to recognize a self is that its life may be 
narrated in the real world; it can be a living subject of a story. Being the 
protagonist of a story distinguishes as self from impersonal mental pro-
cesses, traits, feelings and opinions. Therefore, because long term stories 
can be told about them, Augustine and Sarah (mentioned above), count 
as selves (Belzen 2010, 403–404). The self may be an analogy for God as 
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a self-reflexive being, a being whose unity integrates all of whom he is, 
and is also identified as a self because real world stories may be told of 
him as their protagonist. In sum, a human self is analogous to God in that 
both the self and God are self-reflexive, intentional beings, of whom sto-
ries may be told. Below I suggest that because selves are internally com-
plex, they serve as an analogy for the Godhead that at the same times 
takes into account the trinitarian plurality inherent to Godhead. This is 
followed by the point that God (and selves) are inherently relational. 
Each Self is a psychological society 
Dialogical Self Theory belongs within psychological models of the hu-
man self that view persons as dynamic and internally social beings. DST 
also recognizes social dimensions and influences on one other (Moore, 
Jasper and Gillespie 2011).In fact, most branches of psychological science 
today propose that a human being is not essentially a monadic rational 
mind. In fact, humans are multifaceted composite beings. Van der Kolk 
writes that “[e]very major school of psychology recognizes that people 
have subpersonalities,” and that “[m]odern neuroscience has confirmed 
the notion of the mind as a kind of society” (van der Kolk 2014, 280). The 
empirical basis for this claim stems from the research of Michael Gaz-
zaniga, “who conducted pioneering split-brain research, concluded that 
the mind is composed of semi-autonomous functioning modules, each of 
which has a special role” (ibid.). This research concurs with findings to do 
with studies on the complexity of personality as well as the factors that 
shape it. For example, Baumert et. al write: “personality processes, per-
sonality structure, and personality development have to be understood 
and investigated in integrated ways in order to provide comprehensive 
responses to the key questions of personality psychology” (Baumert et al. 
2017, 503). The complexity of the self is shown by the fact that post-trau-
matic recovery and growth involves cultivating integration and synchro-
nization between dissociative and often discordant areas of the brain and 
the self (van der Kolk 2014; Herman 2001).
Studies on parallel emotional processing in human beings that sug-
gests that the mind is complex (Peyk 2009), and trauma studies that dem-
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onstrate the extent to which a single self may become fragmented, dis-
sociated, and within whom a number of parties will work against one 
another during recovery process. The complexity of the self is shown by 
the fact that post-traumatic recovery and growth involves cultivating in-
tegration and synchronization between dissociative and often discordant 
areas of the brain and the self (van der Kolk 2014; Herman 2001). Dialogi-
cal Self Theory draws upon findings such as these and related ones that 
indicate the internal richness of each human being, and has been devel-
oped and used clinically.
3. Dialogical Self Theory
Dialogical Self Theory offers conceptual models for the human person, in 
which the person is construed as an internally and externally communi-
cative and relational self. I use notions of the self with Belzen’s caution in 
mind. He writes that in terms of the “self”: “we are not dealing here with 
anything that would be conceptually clear: after more than a century of 
research and theorizing, psychologists still can’t tell what that is: self. 
Nor can they satisfyingly explain what ‘mental health’ is” (Belzen 2010, 
399). One of the pioneers of DST theory, Hubert Hermans, recently sum-
marized DST as follows: 
In a nutshell DST assumes, firstly, that the self can be conceived as a “society 
of mind” or as a multiplicity of embodied I-positions among which dialogical 
relationships can exist, and, secondly, that the “I” is capable of shifting from 
one position to another in accordance with different, and even contrasting, 
situations. The self is not autonomous and unified, but dialogical and mul-
tiple; so, it is not a substance within itself but deeply relational (Hermans 
2020, 232).
He continues: “And the other is not an outside entity but an existing part 
of the self.” I don’t take this to be relevant to the existence of the Godhead 
as classically conceived, this aspect of DST is more in concert with works 
such as (Hewitt, 2018). 
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Another way to state how DST conceives of a person is “the dialogical 
self is described as a democratic self” (ibid.). Hermans writes that “de-
mocracy as metaphor for a dialogical organization of the self as a society 
of mind” (ibid.). Salient aspects of DST’s model of a person that may be 
used as an analogy for the Godhead that at the same time may have af-
finities with God’s nature as the Trinity as described below. I acknowl-
edge that this is my reading of DST, of which there are a number of mod-
els. I will list these aspects below, then draw them into conversation with 
Erickson’s standard conception of God the Trinity. 
(1) A Dialogical Self is a unity of multiple I-positions:
Each human being, or self, is a single entity. It is numerically one, yet each 
self has a rich internal life, comprised of I-positions (Hermans-Konopka 
2012, 423). I-positions have been described as “subselves” or “inner voic-
es” that are “just below the level of the whole” (Hermans 2002, 151, cit-
ing Hofstadter (1986, 782). For this reason, the major assumption of DST 
is that “the mind is polyphonic” (Hermans 2020, 231).
These I-positions are voices in the subjective experience of each hu-
man being. Each I-position is a perspective on the world and the voiced 
perspective that goes with this. For example, the voice that says “I am al-
ways ignored at work” or “I have a bad feeling about this.” There is a neu-
rological basis for the fact that people experience the world through nu-
merous perspectives and express these perspectives as I-positions. For 
example, when a person touches their hand to their cheek, they receive 
two inputs and two perspectives – from the cheek and from the hand re-
spectively– when they do so. The cheek sends a message of touching the 
hand, and vice versa, the hand sends a message of touching the cheek. 
These are two different sensory experiences and messages. The mind 
is dialogical (conversational) in that it has to handle the sensory input, 
neurological exchange and resulting interaction between the check being 
touched and the hand touching it (Hermans 2002, 152). 
A human self is a single being. The plurality of each self in terms of I-
positions does not undermine its unity. The self is the united life of the 
I-positions, even if the I-positions do not relate well to each other. Even 
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in a disordered self, there is not a self without the interactive life (the ex-
istence-in-unity) of the I-positions. In other words, each particular self 
being is itself due to the existence of various I-positions. In addition to 
essential unity of the I-positions that constitutes the self, there is func-
tional unity between the I-positions: “attention, action and motivation 
synchronize the brain so that its activities are unified” (Hermans 2002, 
150). Psychological science suggests that human beings are neurologi-
cally wired up as dialogical selves who by nature manage the inter-rela-
tionships of I-positions within themselves. For example, consider the dia-
logical conversation that occurs within a child an infant who falls off the 
skateboard they just got for Christmas. They fall off the board and scrape 
their knee on the pavement. Two I-positions may quickly develop within 
the one person, one is “my knee really hurts, I am in pain,” and anoth-
er I-position is that of their inner helper: “I can help.” Another might be, 
“I look clumsy to others when I fall off.” 
Psychological science shows that a  successfully developing children 
and infants will demonstrate the ability to co-ordinate their I-positions 
in such situations. This co-ordination is shown when they shape their 
mouth to kiss the knee even before they touch the knee to their mouth; 
this demonstrates their ability to co-ordinate the I-position stemming 
from pain in the knee – “my knee really hurts, I am in pain” – and the 
I- position of their inner helper (the helper “I”) can help (ibid.). There-
fore, human persons are dialogical selves, a unity of various I-positions. 
Importantly, the I-positions are not “extra” to the dialogical self. Each 
human dialogical self is constituted by these I-positions: who the self is 
and how the self relates to the world is determined by the interplay of the 
voices and viewpoints in the society of their mind. At this point we may 
make a distinction between person and a self. A is only ever one “I” or 
“I-position,” yet a self is the sum and union of a number of “I-positions.” 
So whereas a person may only ever speak from the point of view of one 
“I- position,” a self may speak from a number of perspectives that consti-
tute who that self is. 
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(2) The I-positions within the self are unique, yet relationally de-
pendent upon one another:
Each I-position contributes to how the person sees the world, with each 
voice being present yet taking a  lead role at various points of experi-
ence and response to the world (Ribeiro and Gonçalves 2012, 309–311). 
In a healthy person, the I-positions and their voices are not independent 
from one another: they are related and vocalized with respect to one an-
other (Hermans-Konopka 2012, 423). There is debate about the extent of 
dependence, co-operation, and autonomy between the self’s I positions. 
Naturally, a fuller take on DST includes the influence of other persons on 
the formation of the self: see (Hermans-Konopka 2012, 423). On the one 
hand, some argue that there is a relative autonomy between the I-positions, 
each shaping the self in a mostly independent manner (Nir 2012, 284). Rela-
tive autonomy in this instance refers to “Each I-position is endowed with 
different views, memories, wishes, motives, interests and feelings, and 
therefore has a distinct story to tell from its own experience and its own 
stance” (ibid.). Notwithstanding the possibility of this kind of relative au-
tonomy, and on the other hand, scholars argue for a negotiation process 
between these voices, which may come to compose a coherent self: 
an individual involved in the act of identity construction brings these differ-
ent voices/positions into open dialogue within the self and with others and in 
the process is able to move toward, move away or even oppose positions/voic-
es he/she agrees with or disagrees with … Hence, the act of self-construction 
is an ongoing negotiation process … whereby the self has the ability to inte-
grate mutual and opposing voices/positions into a coherent self of ‘who I am’ 
leading to construction of unity-in-multiplicity. (Eze, Lindegger and Rakoczy 
2015, 400).
(3) As vital aspects of the self, the I-positions are in communicative 
relationships with one another:
Communication between a person’s inner voices is core to DST theory, 
a “multiplicity of collective voices that create interfaces … in the micro-
society of the self” (Hermans 2011, 3). Hence, the I-positions relate to one 
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another within the self (Ribeiro and Gonçalves 2012, 309–11). The signif-
icance of this communication for the human person is shown in the fact 
that pathologies such as schizophrenia emerge when the I-positions are 
unable to communicate, or when a person is unable to switch from one I-
position to another (Hermans 2002, 153).
(4) The I-positions are in mutually influential relationships with 
one another:
The I-positions influence one another: “the self is organized as a dialogi-
cal interchange between mutually influencing I-positions in the society 
of the mind” (Nir 2012, 284.) Hence, the relationships between the I-po-
sitions influence whom the self is, without compromising the unity of the 
self. That is, “[t]he I moves … from the one to the other position, creating 
dynamic fields in which self-negotiations … result in a great variety of 
meanings” (Hermans, 2001, 252).
(5) There may be harmony between the I-positions and hence the 
self is an integrated being:
As noted above, ideally, the self is a harmonious and coherent society of 
these voices (Eze, Lindegger and Rakoczy 2015, 400). 
(6) Agreed upon points of reference provide stability for the self be-
cause these points of reference frame the healthy relational pat-
terns between I-positions:
One contributing factor to the harmony between these voices, and hence 
the unity of the self, is the “frames” within which they operate (Moore, 
Jasper and Gillespie 2011, 510). Stability of self may be achieved through 
reference to, and the impact of “norms, values, material objects, and in-
stitutions” on the I-positions (ibid.). These frames serve to guide the har-
mony, unity and interactions between I-positions by promoting some 
views and not others with reference to prior agreed upon norms (ibid., 
512). Frames work by “subjecting” or constraining the I-positions “to 
normative ‘standards,’ to social appraisal based on norms of honesty, ef-
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ficiency, economy, safety, elegance, tactfulness, good taste, and so on” 
(ibid.). That is, “Each frame consists of expectations which are unique to 
that frame. These expectations are the manifestation of the group’s view 
towards the individual, the basis for both praise and blame, and thus pro-
vide powerful guidance of individual ‘doing’” (ibid., 512–513).
4. Dialogical Self theory as an analogy 
for the kind of Person that the Trinitarian Godhead 
At first glance, it seems that DST’s model of a person appears to provide 
a human analogy for how the Godhead could be conceived as a person or 
self, yet one who is comprised of three I-positions. An immediately ap-
parent example is that the Christian claim that “God is one being in three 
persons,” appears to be compatible with DST’s view that one’s self is one 
entity, yet composed of a number of I-positions (Ratzinger 1990, 444). 
This apparent affinity calls for closer inspection. 
Now that we have outlined DST’s model of a person, we can ask wheth-
er this model of a person is more suitable as an analogy for the trinitarian 
Godhead than the “Buffered Self” models of the person. In what follows, 
I will show how each of the key points of DST outlined as 1–6 above cor-
relate with key points of trinitarian theology if these were revised with 
a view to referring to the divine nature and to divine prosopa/hypostases. 
Once revised and taken together they would suffice to ensure the basic 
points of trinitarian theology as defined by Erikson’s Criteria for concep-
tualizing the Trinity. Millard Erickson writes that a number of necessary 
truths must be met and included in an orthodox doctrine of God the Trin-
ity (Erickson 1998, 362–363). These are (1) the unity of God, (2) the deity 
of each trinitarian person, (3) the eternality of the Trinity, (4) the ways 
in which God is one and three are not the same, hence there is no contra-
diction involved in this doctrine, (5) temporary historical subordination 
does not mean eternal essential subordination, (6) there is a mystery at 
the core of trinitarian theology (ibid.). Follow up work will explore the de-
gree to which a DST-based model for the Godhead is compatible with Hol-
mes’ more exhaustive definition of the Trinity (Holmes 2014, 31).
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“The unity of God” is matched by DST’s claims that a  person is (1) 
“a unity of multiple I-positions”; in the case of the Godhead, this unity 
would be the perfectly harmonious unity of will and attributes, which is 
compatible with DST’s claim (5): “there may be harmony between the I-
positions and hence the self is an integrated being.” Thus, Dialogical Self 
Theory may provide us with a way of understanding the uniqueness of 
God as a perfectly integrated trinitarian Godhead. In the same way that 
the unity of the Godhead is based upon the divine substance with which 
each divine person is identified, each I-position is ultimately identified 
with the substantial core of each human self which is the basis of their 
identity continuity through time. The fact that each person of the Trin-
ity co-inheres one another (perichoresis), and the simplicity of God’s at-
tributes further secure the unity and singularity of God. This divine self 
is the foundation that allows the I-positions to interact with one another 
within the unifying life of one God’s Self. The depths of God’s unity pre-
vents the claim that in God there are multiple or different selves. 
Erickson’s second desideratum is “the deity of each trinitarian person.” 
Though DST cannot offer the deity of each trinitarian person, its use of 
multiple I-positions within the single self is a limited analogy for trinitar-
ian persons constituting the life of the Godhead. DST also offers an anal-
ogy for the way that trinitarian persons are who they are only in relation 
to one another via relations of origin and opposed relations, as per the 
conjunction of the following claims: “(2) The I-positions within the self 
are unique, yet relationally dependent upon one another,” “(3) As vital as-
pects of the self, the I-positions are in communicative relationships with 
one another,” “(4) The I-positions are in mutually influential relation-
ships with one another.” The other point that is compatible with the deity 
of each divine person is that if each I-position in DST were divine it would 
function as an ontological as well as qualitative frame for the other I-po-
sitions. This would be compatible with “(6) Agreed upon points of refer-
ence (that) provide stability for the Self because these points of reference 
frame the healthy relational patterns between I-positions.”
“The eternality of the Trinity,” is compatible with the view that the self 
is a continuous entity across time. 
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“The ways in which God is one and three are not the same, hence there is 
no contradiction involved in this doctrine,” is compatible with the fact that 
for DST there is one self yet multiple I-positions, thus no contradiction 
between the oneness and multiplicity of DST’s view of a person. 
The trinitarian claim that “temporary historical subordination [of di-
vine persons to one another] does not mean eternal essential subordination,” 
aligns with the fact that in a healthy self, I-positions work together in 
democratic ways and action is guided by mutual consent rather than pre-
established hierarchical relationships. 
The trinitarian claim that “there is a mystery at the core of trinitarian 
theology” is compatible with the fact that each self is ultimately mysteri-
ous and hence escapes exhaustive investigation as well as explanation.
There seems to be no surface tension between Erickson’s definition of 
the Trinity and Dialogical Self Theory’s view of the self and the I-posi-
tions. As a caveat at this point, I recognize a drawback of this model for the 
person for referring to God the Trinity as a person is that it does not seem 
to strongly enough account for the unique and incommunicable nature 
of each divine hypostasis; however, this may be remedied via accounts of 
trinitarian relations of origin and opposed relations. Returning to the lack 
of theological surface tension, it opens the possibility of recasting the “Is 
God a person” debate in terms of the Godhead being modelled after a per-
son understood as a Dialogical Self (O’Reilly and Franck forthcoming). In-
stead of referring to God as a person by way of analogy, we could refer to 
God as a self (a Dialogical Self) by way of analogy. As we shall see, the dis-
tinction between these goes far beyond terminology and is rooted in the 
capacity of a self to have multiple “I” positions, whereas a person has only 
one “I” position. The Dialogical Self Analogy for the Godhead is one exam-
ple of how psychological science may help the tasks of Christians theology 
and philosophy. In this case, it provides an analogy for theologians who 
want to speak about God the Trinity as a person in an absolute sense (i.e. 
the Godhead), in a way that takes God’s trinitarian nature into account 
and reserves the technical language of person for the divine prosopa. 
The suitability of the Dialogical Self Analogy for the Godhead is fur-
ther suggested by the fact that proponents of DST must reckon with very 
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similar issues to those with which trinitarian theologians wrestle. For ex-
ample, some of DST’s proponents have struggled with the same issues of 
unity-in-plurality and distinction-in-unity that beset trinitarian theolo-
gy. Consider Hermans’ reflection and question, given that in a single self, 
“attention, action and motivation synchronize the brain so that its activ-
ities are unified.” He asks, “How then can there be a coexistence of rela-
tively autonomous I-positions? How can the person be one yet many?” 
(Hermans 2002, 150). Lewis struggles here too, and is promoted to probe 
the neurobiology of how there may be unity and as well as moving be-
tween I-positions in terms of how a Dialogical Self functions in the world 
(Lewis 2002); to my mind this loosely parallels the doctrine of appropria-
tion for the Trinity. 
Conclusion
This essay has proposed the Dialogical Self Analogy for conceptualising 
the Godhead as a self, as an alternative to using the language of person 
for the Godhead. Such an analogy enables us to speak about Godhead 
along the conceptual lines offered by a human self, whilst also reckon-
ing with his trinitarian nature, as shown by meeting Erickson’s criteria 
for the Trinity. Its success also lies in speaking about God as self who is 
a unique relational and communicative kind of being, yet it reserves the 
language of a person for the divine prosopa/hypostases. Furthermore, 
this model of God may be the basis for a robust version of personalism as 
the foundation for theology and ethics. A number of avenues for further 
research into the nature of God persons have also been noted; these will 
likely benefit from the integration of psychological science with Christian 
theology and philosophy. Further work needs to outline and further ex-
ploring the person-substance relationships that Dialogical Self Analogy 
for the Godhead entails, with a view to ensuring this model is compatible 
with our received conciliar trinitarianism. Beyond situating a Dialogical 
Self Analogy within the bounds of Conciliar Trinitarianism, a more ambi-
tious investigation could be made into whether the Dialogical Self Anal-
ogy for the Godhead may be situated within the development of Christian 
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doctrine as outlined by Vincent of Lérins in his classic fifth century work 
Commonitorium or Cardinal Henry Newman’s An Essay on the Development 
of Christian Doctrine. Further to this, one could explore the compatibility 
of the Dialogical Self Analogy for the Godhead with Scott Williams’ non-
social indexical model of the Trinity, in which each divine person is able 
to take the position of an “I” within the Trinity’s singular shared men-
tal state and spiritual life (Williams 2013).2 DST may also be employed to 
the end of providing a psychologically grounded account of “group self” 
analogy for the Trinity as proposed by C.J.F. Williams (Williams 1994).3 
Finally, a more experimental avenue for exploration would be to recast St. 
Richard of Victor’s definition of a person as a “unique spiritual existence 
with a dialogical and relational nature,” and note the different ways that 
this would seem to apply to the Godhead’s dialogical self as well as to the 
divine prosopa/hypostases, yet without causing contradiction.
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